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CAN PRE-PURCHASE ENTRPRENEURIAL
EFFORTS SATISFY THE FOURTH PRONG OF
THE HOWEY' TEST? A CRITIQUE OF SEC V.
LIFE PARTNERS, INC.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In federal securities litigation, the threshold inquiry is
whether the transaction at issue involves a "security."3 If the
transaction does not involve a security, then federal securi-
ties laws4 do not govern the proceedings.5 Despite the impor-
tance of this issue, a "successful definition of 'security' has
eluded American corporate law" for over sixty years.6 Some
scholars have called this "one of the most notable intellectual
failures [in this area of law]."' Such "intellectual failure" has
been most notable in the judicial analysis of "investment con-
1. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
2. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 102 F.3d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
3. Most commonly thought of as a share of stock in a corporation, a
"security" is a commodity that has no intrinsic value in itself; rather, it repre-
sents rights in something else. See, e.g., DAVID RATNER, SECURITIES
REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 1 (5th ed. 1996). For example, a share of stock
represents an interest in a company. The value of that stock depends upon the
future profitability of the company that issued the stock. See generally,
RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 264-66 (7th ed. 1992 &
Supp. 1996) (explaining the issue of "defining a security").
4. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1994), [hereinafter
"1933 Act"] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.
(1994), [hereinafter "1934 Act"] offer extensive remedies for statutory violations
of securities laws that greatly exceed common law remedies for economic
harms. This comment will focus upon the 1933 Act. See discussion infra Part
II.A.
Common violations of the 1933 Act include failure to comply with sections
5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 for issuing securities that are not
registered with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) & 77e(c) (1994).
5. See Douglas M. Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme
Court's Literalism and the Definition of "Security" in the State Courts, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1993) (stating that the conclusion that a case
does not involve a "security" will foreclose application of the relevant securities
act).
6. Robert R. Joseph, Comment, Should Interests in Limited Liability
Companies be Deemed Securities?: The Resurgence of Economic Reality in In-
vestment Contract Analysis, 44 EMORY L.J. 1591, 1596 (1995).
7. See id. at 1596 n.27 (citing William J. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, De-
fining a "Security:" Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY
L.J. 73 (1981)).
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tracts"8-- one category of securities. This comment critiques
the recent decision of Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") v. Life Partners, Inc.,9 in order to expose an unre-
solved issue in investment contract analysis.
Although not defined in the federal securities acts,1° the
seminal Supreme Court decision of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co."
outlined the presently used test ("the Howey test") to deter-
mine whether an "investment contract" is a "security." Un-
der this test, an investment contract is "[1] a transac-
tion... [2] whereby a person invests money, [3] in a common
enterprise, and [4] is led to expect profits solely from the ef-
forts of the promoter." 3 The Howey test, applied only to in-
vestment contracts, 4 has generally been effective for analyz-
ing whether "novel, uncommon, or irregular [investment]
devices"'5 come beneath the umbrella of federal securities
8. The term "investment contract" is listed as one of the categories that
define a "security." See § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1994); see
also infra note 86 and accompanying text.
An "investment contract," while not a conventional-security like a bond or
share of common stock, has essential properties of a conventional security in
that it is an undivided, passive (i.e. not managed by the investor), financial in-
terest in a pool of assets, and, thus, is treated as a conventional security for
purposes of securities laws. SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995),
reh'g denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11609 (7th Cir. May 17, 1995).
9. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that viatical settlements were not
securities under the Securities Act of 1933).
10. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
11. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
12. Id. at 298-99.
13. Id. (numerals added). Most courts reduce the Howey test to three ele-
ments. See, e.g., Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542, 542-45 (citing the test as "(1) ex-
pectation of profits arising from (2) a common enterprise that (3) depends upon
the efforts of others"). However, this comment will refer to the Howey test as
originally laid out in a four-pronged test.
Each element of the Howey test must be satisfied before a particular trans-
action is characterized as a "security." See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d
81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994).
14. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985) (stating that
application of the Howey test to traditional stocks and all other types of in-
struments would make the enumerated categories of section 2(1) of the 1933
Act superfluous).
15. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (using
the phrase "novel, uncommon, or irregular devices" to describe types of ar-
rangements that can qualify as investment contracts under the 1933 and 1934
Acts). While the Joiner decision offered the first test for "investment con-
tracts," the Howey test remains the primary legal standard for determining
whether an investment contract is a security. See, e.g., Park McGinty, What Is
a Security?, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1046 n.62 (1993).
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laws.16 Nevertheless, judicial analysis of this test continues
to expose uncertainties regarding its proper application. 7
The recent decision in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. 8 has re-
vealed such an uncertainty with respect to the fourth prong
of the Howey test. In Life Partners, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit had to resolve whether
"fractional interests in viatical settlements"'9 promoted by
the defendant, Life Partners, Inc. ("LPI"), constituted
"investment contracts" (thus, securities) under the Howey
test.2" The court's resolution turned on an analysis of the
fourth prong." The SEC argued that the pre-purchase efforts
of LPI in selecting and promoting its viatical settlements,
greatly influenced the investor's profits, thereby establishing
the fourth prong of the Howey test." However, the court con-
cluded that LPI's viatical settlements were not securities be-
16. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1052-53.
17. For recent cases grappling with the application of the Howey test, see
United States v. Holtzclaw, 950 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.W. Va. 1997); Allen v.
Lloyd's of London, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300 (E.D. Va. 1996); SEC v. Pinck-
ney, 923 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (concerning prime bank instruments).
18. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir), reh'g denied, 102 F.3d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The
SEC alleged violations of sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a) (1994), and sections 10(b), 15(a) and 15(c) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(a), 78o(c) (1994). See SEC v. Life Partners,
Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995).
19. Viatical settlements are transactions where one may purchase an inter-
est in the life insurance policy of a terminally ill person-usually an AIDS pa-
tient-for some fraction of the policy's face value. See infra note 196.
This comment does not address whether viatical settlements are securities.
Rather, this comment uses a case about viatical settlements to point out an ex-
isting uncertainty regarding an application of the Howey test. For more infor-
mation concerning legal issues surrounding viatical settlements, see Timothy P.
Davis, Should Viatical Settlements Be Considered "Securities" under the 1993
Securities Act?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 75 (1997); Malcolm E. Osborn, Rap-
idly Developing Law on Viatical Settlements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471
(1996); Russell J. Herron, Note, Regulating Viatical Settlements: Is the Invisi-
ble Hand Picking the Pockets of the Terminally Ill?, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
931 (1995); and Shanah D. Glick, Comment, Are Viatical Settlements Securities
Within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
957 (1993).
20. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538. It is likely they proceeded under the
Howey test because viatical settlements are a recent form of investment prod-
uct and do not easily fit within the established types of securities such as
stocks, bonds and notes. See section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1)
(1994). Thus, viatical settlements represent "novel" investment devices. See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
21. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545-48. Note, the Life Partners court referred
to the "efforts of others" prong as the "third prong." Id. at 540.
22. See id. at 545-48.
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cause the pre-purchase efforts by LPI, in the absence of sub-
stantial post-purchase efforts, could not satisfy the fourth
element of the Howey test.
2
This comment critiques the Life Partners court's analysis
of the fourth prong of the Howey test. Specifically, this com-
ment focuses upon whether the fourth prong can be met if
the investor's expectation of profits derives from the "efforts
of a promoter" that take place prior to the purchase of the in-
vestment. Until the Life Partners decision, no federal case
had explicitly decided whether pre-purchase efforts can sat-
isfy this element. 24 Furthermore, no Supreme Court decision
has formally distinguished pre-purchase from post-purchase
efforts in analyzing Howey's fourth prong."
This comment maintains that a promoter's pre-purchase
entrepreneurial efforts can satisfy the fourth prong of the
Howey test under the prescribed approach. 6  Part II, the
background section, provides a brief legislative history of the
1933 and 1934 Acts. 7 It then underscores the essential prin-
ciples underlying the federal securities laws28 and offers the
statutory definition of a "security."9 Part II also summarizes
the Howey decision" and highlights relevant portions of the
Life Partners decision. 1 Part III identifies the legal problem
exposed by the Life Partners decision as it relates to the
Howey test.32  Part IV, the analysis section, dissects the
weaknesses of the Life Partners majority and uses the
strength of the dissent, as well as support from other
sources, to lay the foundation for the proposed approach re-
garding fourth prong Howey analysis.33 Finally, Part V, the
proposal section, offers a five-part approach to analyze
whether an investment promoter's pre-purchase entrepre-
neurial efforts satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test. 4
23. See id. at 547-48.
24. Id. at 553 (Wald, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. See infra Part II.D-E.
31. See infra Part II.F.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.




A. The Federal Securities Acts: A Brief Legislative History
Until 1933, securities regulation was exclusively the
province of state "blue sky" laws.35 Congress enacted the
1933 and 1934 Acts in the aftermath of the stock market
crash of 1929 "to eliminate serious abuses in a largely un-
regulated securities market."6 Accordingly, the federal secu-
rities acts are considered "remedial legislation."37 The federal
government, when proposing the 1933 Act, did not intend to
"approve or guarantee that newly issued securities are
sound."38 Rather, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt de-
clared at the time of its enactment, the 1933 Act "adds to the
ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine, 'let the
seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller ... [to] give impetus to honest dealing in
securities."39
The 1933 Act regulates public offerings of securities by
compelling the disclosure of material information through a
registration statement4" submitted to the Securities and Ex-
35. For instance, in Howey, the Supreme Court adopted the definition of
"investment contract" as had been "uniformly applied by state courts." See
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). Blue sky laws are state-
adopted securities statutes that require offerings to comply with certain sub-
stantive standards, and if the offerings fail to meet those standards, the securi-
ties cannot be sold in the particular state. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr.,
Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 175, 177 (1997).
36. United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). See gener-
ally, JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3 at 151-56 (providing background on the
1933 Act). Although the documentation of this history is "scanty," for a good
background into the history underlying the securities laws, see James M. Lan-
dis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
29 (1959).
37. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337 (1967) (referring to
securities laws as remedial legislation).
38. 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933) (comments from President Franklin D. Roose-
velt, March 29, 1933), reprinted in 1 JACK S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 937 (1973).
39. Id. In addition, some of the underlying policies of the federal securities
acts shall be discussed in this comment. See infra Part II.B.
40. Section 5 of the 1933 Act requires new issues of securities to be regis-
tered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994);
see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g and 77aa (1994) (information required in a registra-
tion statement); see generally, JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3 at 168-71
(discussing the basic contents of a registration statement). In addition to filing
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change Commission ("SEC").4 The 1933 Act is a "more or
less coherent and unified statute directed almost entirely to
two fundamental objectives: full disclosure in connection the
distribution of securities and the prevention of fraud in the
sale of securities."42 The 1934 Act regulates trading in secu-
rities by requiring companies to file various reports to the
SEC.43 This comment refers primarily to the 1933 Act, since
this is the act that governs the initial offering requirements
of securities.4 Under the 1933 Act, "if an investment fulfills
the Act's definition of a security, and has not been specifically
exempted from compliance with the Act's provisions, the is-
suer of that security must comply with specific disclosure re-
quirements before proceeding with the public offering."41
B. General Principles Underlying the Federal Securities
Laws
Three tenets underlying the federal securities acts are
emphasized throughout this comment. First, the federal se-
curities laws were passed with the goal of providing informa-
tion to the investing public.46 Second, courts apply flexible
approaches and liberal construction in addressing whether
an investment program should fall within the purview of fed-
eral securities laws. 47 Third, courts stress the economic sub-
stance underlying the investment at issue, rather than its
form.48  These three principles reoccur throughout Supreme
a registration statement with the SEC, the 1933 Act also requires that issuers
of securities prepare a prospectus for the public, which contains similar mate-
rial information as the registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994)
(information required in a prospectus).
41. The Securities and Exchange Commission is an independent, non-
partisan regulatory agency created under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3, at 98. As the agency charged with ad-
ministering and enforcing federal securities laws, the SEC's primary responsi-
bilities "are to ensure that the securities markets are fair and honest and to
provide investors with adequate disclosure." Id.
42. Id. at 531.
43. See generally, id. at 531-37 (providing an overview of the 1934 Act). Ac-
cording to Jennings, the 1934 Act "is something of a hodgepodge of different
provisions, some of which are largely unrelated to others." Id. at 531.
44. Furthermore, the ensuing discussion focuses upon whether or not cer-
tain types of transactions are securities.
45. Glick, supra note 19, at 959 n.12 (quoting JAMES COX ET AL., SECU-
RITIES REGULATION 215 (1991)).
46. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
47. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
48. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
274 [Vol. 38
HOWEY'S FOURTH PRONG
Court precedent49 in addressing the "definition of a security."
1. The Need to Provide Information to Investors
A basic objective of the 1933 Act is to provide investors
with material information concerning new issues of securities
offered for sale to the public. ° Thus, underlying the federal
securities laws is the concept that information is the best
form of investor protection from those who use deceptive
practices to promote investment schemes.51 While the federal
securities laws were still in their proposal phase, President
Franklin Roosevelt said, "[there is ... an obligation upon us
to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in inter-
state commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and in-
formation, and that no essentially important element at-
tending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public."" In 1933, the Senate underscored that "the aim [of
the 1933 Act] is to prevent further exploitation of the public
by the sale of... unsound securities ... [and] place adequate
and true information before the investor. 5 3 A fundamental
purpose in implementing the 1933 Act "was to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emp-
tor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry."54
Supreme Court precedent underscores the importance of
providing information to the investor by way of the securities
acts. For instance, in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,5 the Su-
49. See infra note 94.
50. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3, at 103.
51. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 552 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing SEC v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1963)).
52. ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 38, at 937 (message from President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mar. 29, 1933).
53. S. Rep. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933).
54. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)
(emphasis omitted); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text
55. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963) (fundamental purpose common to securities acts was to substitute phi-
losophy of full disclosure for that of caveat emptor); see also Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("one of [the Act's] central purposes is to pro-
tect investors through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securi-
ties"); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 76 (1959) ("[alt
the core of the 1933 Act are the requirements of a registration statement and
prospectus to be used in connection with the issuance of 'securities'...."); A.C.
Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941) ("essential
purpose of securities acts is to protect investors by requiring publication of cer-
tain information concerning securities before offered for sale").
2751997]
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preme Court stated that "[t]he design of the [1933 Act] is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to make informed investment decisions.""
The Ralston Purina court did not address the application of
the Howey test, rather it focused upon whether the defen-
dants were exempt from registering their securities under
the 1933 Act. 8 According to the Court, "[tihe focus of the in-
quiry [to determine whether there has been a public offering]
should be on the need of the offerees for the protections af-
forded by registration."9 In Ralston Purina, whether the of-
ferees needed these protections was determined by whether
they had "access to the kind of information which registra-
tion would disclose."" The employees who were offered the
defendant's company stock did not have access to such infor-
mation.1 Therefore, the Court held that the stock offering
was not exempt from the registration requirements of the
1933 Act.62 This decision exemplifies the importance of the
disclosure requirements mandated by the securities acts.
2. Flexible Approach and Liberal Construction Applied
to the Securities Acts
a. Flexible Approach
A second tenet underlying securities regulations is the
need to preserve judicial flexibility in determining whether
an investment scheme constitutes a "security."63 While
stocks or government bonds represent commonly known se-
curities, unusual types of investments, such as interests in
citrus groves,64 animal breeding programs,65 chinchillas,66 and
56. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
57. Id. at 124.
58. The Ralston Purina court addressed the proper application of section
4(1) of the 1933 Act, which exempts transactions "not involving any public of-
fering" from the registration requirements of the securities laws. Id. at 120.
Ralston Purina's stock offering to its employees was held to be a "public offer-
ing" and, therefore, the corporation violated section 5 of the 1933 Act by not
registering its offering with the SEC. Id. at 127.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 127.
62. Id.
63. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 550 (Wald, J., dissenting).
64. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295.
65. See, e.g., Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
66. Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974).
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dental equipment67 have also been found to satisfy the defini-
tion of a "security" under the 1933 Act. These diverse exam-
ples illustrate that the securities laws offer the "SEC and the
courts sufficient flexibility to ensure that those who market
investments are not able to escape the coverage of the Securi-
ties Acts by creating new instruments that would not be cov-
ered by a more [rigid] definition.""
b. Liberal Construction
In addition to the flexible approach underlying the fed-
eral securities acts, federal courts have historically given a
liberal construction to these statutes. For instance, in SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.," the Supreme Court had to de-
termine whether one provision of the 1933 Act 0 was to be
construed liberally or strictly. In order to do so, the Court
looked to state blue sky laws.71 Upon examining these state
statutes, the Court found that the "weight of authority" is
toward liberal construction, especially if there are civil sanc-
tions imposed. 2
Numerous lower court decisions also stand for the propo-
sition that securities laws are to be liberally construed to ef-
fectuate their remedial purpose. 3 For example, in Timmreck
v. Munn, 4 the district court held that since the federal secu-
rities acts were "devised to protect the public from specula-
tive or fraudulent schemes advanced by promoters, they
must be construed liberally as remedial statutes."75 In es-
sence, it is a familiar canon of legislative construction that
67. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonics Products Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982) (holding that licenses for sale for certain den-
tal devices were "investment contracts" under the Howey test).
68. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990); see also SEC v. In-
ternational Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(emphasizing that Howey's fourth element should be interpreted broadly).
69. 344 U.S. 344 (1943).
70. Id. at 353 (analyzing 15 U.S.C. § 77(t) (Section 20 of the 1933 Act,
"Injunctions and Prosecutions")).
71. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 353.
72. Id. at 353-54.
73. See, e.g., SEC v. Briggs, 234 F. Supp. 618, 622 (N.D. Ohio 1964)
(securities laws are remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor
of the investing public); SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wash. 1940)
(1933 Act is a remedial enactment and should be liberally construed).
74. 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
75. Id. at 399 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
476, 481 (9th Cir. 1973)).
19971
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"remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectu-
ate its purpose."76
3. The Emphasis on Economic Reality
A third key principle underlying the securities laws is
the significance given to the economic reality underlying an
investment transaction.7 7 "In searching for the meaning and
scope of the word 'security' in the [Securities] Acts, form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should
be on economic reality."78 Due to the economic character of
securities transactions, "Congress intended the application of
these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto."79
In the most recent Supreme Court case addressing the
definition of a security, Reves v. Ernst & Young,80 the Court
declared that it is ultimately the federal courts that must de-
cide "which of the myriad financial transactions ... come
within the coverage of [the federal securities acts] .,,81 Moreo-
ver, the Court emphasized that "in discharging our duty, we
are not bound by legal formalisms, but instead take account
of the economics of the transaction under investigation."82
The Court continued, "Congress' purpose in enacting the se-
curities [acts] was to regulate investments, in whatever form
they are made and by whatever name they are called."83
C. The Statutory Definition of a Security Under Section 2(1)
of the 1933 Act
When drafting the definition of a security in the 1933
Act, Congress had to draw the line between being overly
broad and underinclusive.84 According to some scholars, the
1933 Act represents a compromise between the two extremes
76. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
77. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3, at 285 (citing Carl W. Schneider, The
Elusive Definition of a "Security"--1990 Update, 24 REV. OF SECURITIES &
COMMODITIES REG. 13 (1991)).
78. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336.
79. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975).
80. 494 U.S. 56 (1990). Although this case addressed whether "notes" con-
stituted securities under section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, it provides relevant back-
ground to this discussion of economic realities. Id. at 60-63.
81. Id. at 61 (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 848).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1037.
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of restrictive simplicity and expansive overbreadth.8" The re-
sulting statutory definition of a security as provided in sec-
tion 2(1) of the 1933 Act states, in pertinent part:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires-(1) [tihe term 'security' means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement,... investment contract,.., or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security' 
.... 86
Since the promulgation of this definition, the courts have
construed the term "security" broadly enough to include a
wide variety of schemes, but narrowly enough to exclude
those "arrangements whose names may fortuitously suggest
a security but whose economic realities do not."87 "The secu-
rities (acts are] remedial in nature, and the definitional
paragraph contain[s] the phrase 'investment contract,' a
category... sufficiently broad to reach 'devious' schemes" 88
intended to repackage investment plans in order to avoid
coverage under the securities acts.89 In short, the inclusion of
the term "investment contract" in the definitional paragraph
was intended as a "catch-all category."9
Promoters of investment schemes that qualify as
"investment contracts" must comply with the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act 9' and with the rules promulgated
85. See id. at 1039-40.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the definition
of a security in section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act is virtually identical and, for
present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the same.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 322, 338-39 (1967) (establishing the general
proposition that, absent special circumstances, the definition of a security is the
same under the 1934 Act as the 1933 Act).
87. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1038 (giving an overview of the Court's
changing approach to securities laws generally); see also ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LEwIs D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.4 (1992).
In addition, the Supreme Court held in United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975), that even though the investors' interests in low-cost, coop-
erative housing was labeled "stock," these instruments were not securities. Id.
at 858.
88. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1043.
89. Id. at 1042.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 40-41. Those that issue "securities" without comporting
with registration requirements violate section 5 of the 1933 Act and are subject
to civil liabilities under federal law. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3, at 104. The
SEC usually seeks to enjoin promoters from selling such securities in violation
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by the SEC.92  However, the amorphous, catch-all term
"investment contract" is neither defined in the federal securi-
ties acts nor in their congressional history.93
D. Howey: The Foundation of Investment Contract Analysis
Thus far, eleven Supreme Court cases have addressed
the issue of the definition of a security ("definition cases").94
For almost forty years after the securities laws were enacted,
the Supreme Court's definition cases exclusively involved in-
vestment contracts.95 The problem faced by the Court "was
giving the term 'investment contract' suitable parameters."96
In Howey, the investment scheme at issue involved the
company's promotion of citrus grove land plots to guests of
the company's Florida hotel.97 In addition to buying land
plots, purchasers were required to employ a service company
to tend to the citrus groves.9" Purchasers could choose their
own service company or the service company owned by the
W.J. Howey Company.99 The SEC sought to enjoin the W.J.
of section 5 of the 1933 Act through Enforcement Proceedings. See generally,
id. at 1404-72 (discussing SEC Enforcement Actions). The SEC publishes its
Enforcement Proceedings on-line in LEXIS, in the Fedsec library.
92. See generally, JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3, at 98-102.
93. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
94. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (leaseholds plus
a promise to drill for oil); SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (citrus
groves plus citrus grove servicing contracts); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity contracts where the insurance
company bore none of the risk of variations in the worth of the annuity); SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (variable annuity contracts
where the insurance company bore only some of the risk of variations in the
worth of the annuity); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable
capital shares in a savings and loan institution); United Housing Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (stock evidencing the right to occupy subsidized
housing); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)
(interests in a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (interest in a certificate of deposit and a profit-
sharing agreement); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985)
(common stock representing 100% of the ownership interest in a corporation);
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) (common stock representing 50% of
the ownership interest in a corporation); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1990) (promissory notes of a farmers' cooperative).
95. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); United Benefit Life Ins., 387 U.S. 202
(1967); Variable Annuity Life Ins., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); Howey, 328 U.S. 293
(1946); Joiner, 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
96. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1043.
97. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294.
98. Id. at 295.
99. Id.
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Howey Company from selling unregistered and non-exempt
securities in violation of the 1933 Act. ' The defendants ar-
gued that there was no violation of the 1933 Act because
their citrus grove investment program was not a security as
defined in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. 1 1
The legal issue in Howey was whether the citrus grove
land plot plus service contract constituted an "investment
contract" under section 2(1).102 As the Court stated, "an af-
firmative answer brings into operation the registration re-
quirements of section 5(a) [of the 1933 Act].
In reaching its conclusion, the Court adopted a four part
test 0 4 to determine that the citrus grove-service agreement
promoted by the W.J. Howey Company constituted an in-
vestment contract, and, thus, a "security."'0 5  Under the
adopted test, an investment contract, for purposes of the
1933 Act, means "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby
a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party."106 According to the Howey court, this test neces-
sarily permitted the fulfillment of Congress' intent by com-
pelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of "the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall
within the ordinary concept of a security."107 The test em-
bodies "a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits."'
The Howey four-pronged test would seem to lend itself to
100. Id. at 294.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 297.
103. SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). Section 5(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 provides that, "unless a registration statement is in ef-
fect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly... to make use of any means or instruments ... in interstate com-
merce ... to sell such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1994).
104. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 297-300; see also supra note 13 and accompa-
nying text.
105. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300. Although the first of the "definition cases" was
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), see supra note 15, a re-
vised test was enunciated in Howey. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
106. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
107. Id. at 299 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933)).
108. Id.
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straightforward analysis."°' Yet, this seemingly simple test
has led to many court holdings and law review articles that
indicate an uncertainty regarding how to interpret its ele-
ments." ° As new types of investment schemes and programs
develop in the financial world,"' courts, both federal and
state, continue to struggle with the proper application of the
elements of the Howey test.'
E. Focus: The Fourth Element of Howey
In order for an investment contract to be deemed a
"security," each element of the Howey test must be fulfilled."3
Much litigation has centered upon interpreting the first three
elements of this test, but those debates are beyond the scope
of this comment."' Assuming that a court finds that an in-
vestment scheme satisfies the first three prongs of the Howey
test, then the fourth element-expectation of profits from the
109. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1048.
110. See, e.g., Maura K. Monaghan, Note, An Uncommon State of Confusion:
The Common Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2135 (1995) (focusing upon the current split among circuit courts con-
cerning the "common enterprise" element).
111. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 1597; see also United States v. Holtzclaw,
950 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.W. Va. 1997) (addressing whether the "pyramid
scheme" sold by the defendants is an investment contract and, thus, a security);
SEC v. Comcoa Ltd., 855 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (applying the Howey
test to investments in Federal Communications Commission licensing pro-
gram); People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 658 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1995)
(applying the Howey test to investment program in numismatic coin portfolios).
112. See, e.g., SEC v. Life Partners, 87 F.3d 536, 545-48 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(discussing the difficulty in applying Howey's fourth prong to fractional inter-
ests in viatical settlements marketed by defendants).
113. Monaghan, supra note 110, at 2146.
114. The first element requires the existence of a "scheme or transaction"-
an element that is often met, but rarely mentioned as part of the Howey test.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
The second element requires an investment of money. Id. at 299. Courts
have generally held that consideration other than cash will suffice to meet this
element. See Joseph C. Long, An Attempt to "Return Investment Contracts" to
the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 161 (1971)
(noting that consideration does not have to be cash to meet the second ele-
ment); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)
(holding that employee interests in a non-contributory compulsory pension plan
did not meet the investment of money requirement).
The third element requires a "common enterprise" which "posits some on
going relationship or nexus among individuals with respect to a transaction."
Monaghan, supra note 110, at 2148. For a good discussion of the interpretation
problems associated with this element, see Monaghan, supra note 110.
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efforts of the promoter"-becomes the linchpin of the analy-
sis. Before reaching the main issue of this comment-pre-
purchase entrepreneurial activities-the next three sections
break the fourth prong of the Howey test into manageable
components to highlight their current interpretation by fed-
eral courts.
1. Expectation of Profits
The courts have interpreted the term "profits" broadly,
by refusing to confine the term to any one form of financial
return.116 In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,"7
the Supreme Court held that shares in a cooperative apart-
ment complex did not meet the "expectation of profits" re-
quirement of Howey because the purchaser's incentive in en-
tering into the transaction was to obtain affordable housing
and not to earn a financial return."8 Under Forman, there
needs to be a capital appreciation or a "participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds," to meet
this prong of the Howey test."9 In addition, courts generally
agree that both monetary and non-monetary forms of returns
or earnings on one's investment will meet the "expectation of
profits" sub-element. 20 Although there need not be any
guarantee of profits, for very few investments can guarantee
profits, all that Howey requires is a "reasonable expectation
of profits." 2'
2. "Sole" Reliance Equals "Predominant" Reliance
The Howey court also stated that the investor must
"solely rely" on the promoter's efforts to realize profits.'22
However, none of the cases cited in Howey required "sole re-
liance."2 ' Additionally, three decades after the Howey deci-
sion, the SEC noted that "requiring sole reliance would
merely offer a blueprint for fraud."'24
115. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
116. Monaghan, supra note 110, at 2148.
117. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
118. Id. at 856-57.
119. Id. at 852.
120. See Monaghan, supra note 110, at 2135 nn.102-04.
121. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
122. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
123. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1051.
124. Id.
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In the early 1970s, two Court of Appeals cases, SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises".. and SEC v. Koscot Interplane-
tary, Inc.,"6 addressed the "sole reliance" requirement.
27
Both cases involved whether the pyramid (or multilevel mar-
keting) schemes fostered by the defendants were securities. 2 I
Turner, the master-mind of the defendants in both cases,
promised lavish wealth for investors, but required them to
recruit other investors to lure their investments and aug-
ment the enterprise."9 In both Turner and Koscot, the Courts
of Appeal addressed "whether the exertion of some effort by
an investor is inimical to the holding that a promotional
scheme falls within the definition of an investment con-
tract."10
Rejecting this contention, the Turner court held that this
prong of Howey was satisfied when the "efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones"
("the Turner test")."' According to the court, the defendant's
promotional efforts before potential investors represented the
linchpin of the enterprise's success."' The court determined
that "if it construed 'solely' literally, any investor participa-
tion in the activity would unreasonably deny the investor the
protection of the securities laws.""'
Similarly, the Koscot court found the scheme in Turner
parallel to the Koscot scheme. The Koscot court evaluated its
facts along similar lines as did the Turner court, in order to
reach the same conclusion."' Thus, in adopting the Turner
test, federal courts, as in Koscot, have watered down the
term "sole reliance" to mean "predominant reliance.""
Although this liberal construction of Howey's fourth ele-
ment is not followed in all circuits,"' most Courts of Appeals
125. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
126. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1052.
128. Id. at 1051. See Turner, 474 F.2d at 478-80 (explaining the scheme's
operation).
129. Koscot, 497 F.2d at 475-76; Turner, 474 F.2d at 478-80.
130. Koscot, 497 F.2d at 479; see also Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
131. Id. at 482.
132. Id.
133. Glick, supra note 19, 972 (citing Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
134. Koscot, 497 F.2d at 484-85.
135. McGinty, supra note 15, at 1051.
136. See, e.g., SEC v. Comcoa Ltd., 855 F. Supp. 1258, 1961 n.4 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (citing cases that exemplify the split of authority in the 11th Circuit and
those that have failed to address the issue of whether to adopt the Turner test).
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adopt the Turner test in analyzing the "sole reliance" re-
quirement."7 For example, in SEC v. Comcoa,"' the Florida
district court had to determine whether Comcoa's program
for procuring Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
licenses for investors constituted investment contracts. 9
The Comcoa court, in noting the split of authority that ex-
isted in the Eleventh Circuit on whether the term "solely"
should be applied literally or broadly, 4' adopted the Turner
test to determine that Comcoa's program---obtaining and
marketing FCC licenses on behalf of its investors-
constituted "investment contracts" under the Howey test.""
In reaching this decision, the court maintained that since the
investors did "not have the required technical expertise to
market their licenses themselves, they could not possibly re-
alize a profit from this scheme without significant involve-
ment of others."4 ' In the court's view, "the scheme is no less
an investment contract because some participation by the in-
vestor is required."'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has also adopted the Turner test with respect to the "sole re-
liance" requirement.' In SEC v. International Loan Net-
work, Inc., 4 5 the court held that the fourth prong of the
Howey test required that the "expectation of profits" stem
"predominately from efforts made by others."46 In Interna-
tional Loan Network, the defendants were managers of a
"financial distribution network," a complex pyramid
scheme.' 7  The SEC brought an action against the defen-
dants for selling unregistered securities and for violations of
137. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3 at 222.
138. 855 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
139. Id. at 1259-60. Defendants also assisted the investors in marketing
their FCC licenses. See id at 1261.
140. 855 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
141. Id. (holding that the promises of the post-licensing involvement of Com-
coa militates in favor of finding that investors' profits would be derived from
the significant efforts of Comcoa).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545.
145. 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
146. Id. at 1308.
147. Id. at 1305-06. To participate in International Loan Network's ("ILN")
pyramid sales scheme, one would sign on as an "Individual Representative" to
sell ILN memberships. That member would earn commissions by recruiting
members and on sales made by members he or she recruits. Id.
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the SEC's antifraud rules. "8 In affirming the district court's
finding that the defendant's scheme was a security, the Court
of Appeals held that the investor's profits were expected to
accrue "if not solely, at least predominantly from the efforts
of others.""9  Such a reading of the term "sole reliance" is
consistent with the flexible and liberal principles underlying
the federal securities acts.50
3. Efforts by Promoter Must Be Managerial or
Entrepreneurial
a. Supreme Court Application
The fourth element of Howey addresses the degree of
control exercised over the investment by the promoter."'
Two Supreme Court definition cases, United Housing Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Forman".. and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel,'53 described the "touchstone" of the
Howey test to be "the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
derived from the entrepreneurial ... efforts of others." " '
Both Forman and Daniel underscored the idea that the ef-
forts by a promoter must be entrepreneurial or managerial,
not merely administrative or ministerial. 5' An example of
ministerial or administrative activities is mere preparation of
documents or record-keeping."6  On the other hand, entre-
preneurial efforts could entail the use of the promoter's per-
sonnel, expertise, and equipment with the principal aim of
enabling investors to earn a return on their investments. 1" 7 If
the investor is "an outsider whose profits depend on [such]
148. Id. at 1304.
149. Id. at 1308.
150. Turner, 474 F.2d at 480-81 (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (approaching the definition of a "security" by
keeping in mind the flexible principle of Howey and placing emphasis on eco-
nomic reality)).
151. Monaghan, supra note 110, at 2149.
152. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
153. 439 U.S. 551 (1978).
154. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561; Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
156. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545 (describing LPI's ministerial functions,
such as monitoring health insured's premium payments after the investor se-
cured interest in the insurance policy); see also Koscot, 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th
Cir. 1974) (act of consummating a sale is essentially a ministerial one).
157. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
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exertions by [the promoter], then the disclosure policies of
the [1933 Act] are directly implicated."1 58
b. Authority of the Courts of Appeals
Appellate decisions applying the Howey test have pro-
vided guidance on the "entrepreneurial efforts" requirement
underscored in both Forman and Daniel. For instance, in
Williamson v. Tucker,' the court addressed whether inter-
ests in a real estate joint venture (or general partnership)
constituted an "investment contract," and, thus, a
"security."60 The plaintiffs argued that their interests in the
joint ventures were "investment contracts." 6' They asserted
that the "entrepreneurial efforts of others" requirement of
the Howey test was satisfied because the central tasks in
managing the venture were performed by the defendants.'62
However, the defendants maintained that the plaintiffs pos-
sessed meaningful powers under the joint venture agreement
and contended that these powers were enough to preclude a
finding that the joint venture interests were securities.'
In its analysis of the fourth prong of the Howey test, the
Williamson court focused upon the degree of dependence ex-
isting between the partners and the manager of the joint
venture.' According to the Williamson court, an interest in
a general partnership can constitute a "security" if one part-
ner is so dependent on "some unique entrepreneurial or
managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he can-
not replace the manager."'65 Under this rubric, the William-
son court concluded that the interests in the joint ventures
were not securities."'6 While finding that the interests in this
case were not securities, the court highlighted that "an inves-
158. Monaghan, supra note 110, at 2149.
159. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
160. See id. at 409-17, for a discussion of the procedural posture of the case.
Essentially, plaintiffs Williamson, et. al., filed suit to rescind a joint venture
agreement related to joint interests in real estate and alleged violations of the
federal securities acts against the manager of the property and the original
owners of the property. Id. at 406-9.
161. Id. at 417.
162. Id. at 419.
163. Id. at 425.
164. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d. 404, 417-25, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
897 (1981).
165. Id. at 424.
166. Id. at 425.
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tor who claims his general partnership or joint venture inter-
est is an investment contract has a difficult burden to over-
come."'67 Yet, the court suggested that such a burden can be
surmounted by a showing of "dependence on the unique or ir-
replaceable expertise" of the promoter. 6 '
4. The Timing of the Entrepreneurial Efforts
The foregoing three sections underscore that the fourth
element of Howey requires that an investor must reasonably
expect profits 169 that predominantly derive from reliance on
the entrepreneurial efforts by the promoter or a third
party. 17 But, when must those efforts occur? Must the en-
trepreneurial efforts of the promoter take place after the in-
vestor commits his funds? Most litigation concerning the
fourth element of Howey focuses upon the nature of the post-
purchase managerial functions of promoters.171 Yet, many
cases emphasize pre-purchase efforts to meet this element.1
71
For example, in Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costan-
tino, 7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed
whether investments in Scotch whisky warehouse receipts
were securities."'" The court found all elements of the Howey
test satisfied.'75 In particular, the Glen-Arden court found
the fourth element of the test satisfied because "[an investor
was dependent upon appellants for the utilization of their
'expertise in selecting the type and quality of Scotch whisky
and casks to be purchased." 17 "It [was] not as if they were
buying simply X carloads of wheat or barley.., which could
be supplied by the furnishing of any other carload of wheat or
barley. Rather, the very investment made was in goods to be
specifically selected by the appellants."77 Thus, the Glen-
Arden decision emphasized the promoters pre-purchase ef-
167. Id. at 424.
168. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
169. See supra Part II.D.1.
170. See supra Parts II.D.2-3.
171. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting).
172. See infra notes 173-194 and accompanying text.
173. 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
174. Id. at 1030.
175. Id. at 1035.
176. Id.; see also id. at 1031 (describing how the defendant-appellants pro-
moted the investment program and procured the Scotch whisky in a manner
that enabled defendants to mark up their whisky investments substantially).
177. Id. at 1035.
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forts to find that Howey's fourth prong was met.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit determined whether investments in a
pyramid scheme promoted by the defendants constituted a
"security" in SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc.' 8 An
investor in the pyramid scheme was required to invite others
to come to a promotional meeting to lure them into the
scheme.' 9 At this meeting, if the International Loan Net-
work ("ILN") manager was successful in persuading the po-
tential recruit to actually become a member, then the person
who originally extended the invitation would earn income
from it. 8' Therefore, the court held that ILN's promotional
efforts, before the investor made his or her financial com-
mitment, contributed to profits for all of the pyramid scheme
investors and promoters.'81 Thus, the court viewed the de-
fendant's pre-purchase efforts as influencing investors' prof-
its and held that the final prong of Howey had been satis-
fied.
82
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
placed great importance on the promoter's pre-purchase
managerial efforts in the 1990 decision of Bailey v. J.W.K
Properties, Inc."3 In Bailey, plaintiffs had acquired interests
in the defendants' cattle breeding program.' When the de-
fendants abandoned the program, plaintiffs filed suit alleging
inadequate disclosures in violation of federal securities
laws.'85 The main issue focused on whether the cattle breed-
ing investment program constituted "securities" under the
Howey test."' The district court determined that the main
stumbling block for the plaintiffs was that they "did not ex-
pect profits solely from the efforts of the [defendants] .""
On appeal, the plaintiffs urged the court to look at the
circumstances surrounding the cattle breeding transactions
in order to realize that the investors possessed no meaningful
178. 968 F.2d 1304, 1305-7 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (describing the details of the real
estate pyramid scheme).
179. Id. at 1306-07.
180. Id. at 1308 n.9.
181. Id. at 1308.
182. Id.
183. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
184. Id. at 919.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 920.
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control over the investment.'88 The court agreed that the es-
sential functions of the program "were in the hands of the de-
fendants."'89
In Bailey, the court found that the key element to the
success of the cattle breeding plan was the defendants' pre-
purchase selection of cow embryos and crossbreeding ef-
forts.19° Since "plaintiffs had no expertise in making selec-
tions of embryos and had an extremely limited range of al-
ternative sources of information,"9' they had practical
dependence on the defendant's "special expertise" in the se-
lection of cow embryos, prior to committing their funds to the
program. 9 ' The court relied on the fact that the promoter's
pre-purchase expertise in selecting embryos, apart from its
post-purchase efforts, was the linchpin to the profits realized
by the investors.'93 Therefore, the Bailey court determined
that the cattle breeding program was an investment contract
under the Howey test.'94
The foregoing cases illustrate the prior judicial emphasis
on pre-purchase entrepreneurial efforts by promoters in
finding the fourth prong of the Howey test satisfied.
F. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.9
1. Facts of Life Partners
In SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., the defendant was a lead-
ing marketer of viatical settlements. 9 In order to qualify for
188. Id. at 921.
189. Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1990).
190. Id. at 919.
191. Id. at 924.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 923-24.
194. Id. at 925.
195. 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995), 912 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1996), No. 94-
1861, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3451 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 1996), 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.
1996), reh'g denied, 102 F.3d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
196. Essentially, these transactions function whereby a terminally ill person
(usually an AIDS patient) assigns ownership of his or her life insurance policy
to a buyer. For a description of viatical settlements, see supra note 21.
These viatical settlements "provide AIDS victims with much needed in-
come in the final years of their lives while allowing investors to collect the face
amount of the policy at the insured's death." Life Partners, 912 F. Supp. at 4, 6
(D.D.C. 1996).
There are approximately 60 firms in the United States that broker viatical
settlements; LPI is the largest in the country. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539. In
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LPI's program, the policy holder (the "viator" or "insured")
must have met specific criteria,'97 which* enabled LPI to mar-
ket and sell its viatical settlements to individuals in a man-
ner distinct from other firms.9 Essentially, the company
sold "fractional interests" in the insurance policies of people
with "full blown AIDS" who had a life expectancy of two
years or less.'99 One could pay a small amount (about $650)
to acquire as little as a three percent interest of an insured's
policy."'
To effectuate this viatical settlement transaction, LPI
performed a number of pre-purchase functions requiring a
great deal of expertise.2"' Specifically, an LPI physician con-
ducted life expectancy estimates based upon numerous fac-
tors such as T-cell count and pulmonary studies, as well as
taking into account potential advances in the treatment of
AIDS. 202  In addition, LPI reviewed the viator's insurance
policy, negotiated a price of the policy and prepared legal
documents for the investor.2 3 In its brochures, LPI empha-
sized its detailed assessment of the insured's medical condi-
tion."4 Prior to the Enforcement Proceedings initiated by the
SEC in 1995,205 LPI performed a number of post-transaction
functions, such as making sure the viators did not lapse on
premium payments, monitoring the condition of the insured,
1994, this firm earned more than half of the industry's estimated annual reve-
nues of $300 million. Id.
197. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995).
198. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539.
199. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 22; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539.
200. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539. Thus, if the investor acquired three per-
cent of a life insurance policy with a face value of $100,000 then, upon the
death of the insured, the investor would receive $3,000 as a beneficiary of the
policy. In addition, LPI was the first company to develop a plan where groups
of investors could participate in a viatical settlement through an Individual Re-
tirement Account. Id. at 539. However, this offering by LPI is beyond the
scope of this comment. Instead this comment focuses on the controversy sur-
rounding LPI's program for individual investors.
201. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539.
202. Id. at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing testimony of Dr. John Kelly, an
LPI-employed physician).
203. Id. at 539.
204. Id. at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing the brochure LIFE PARTNERS,
INC., COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Jan. 1993)).
205. See District Court Grants Preliminary Injunction against Life Partners
and Brian Pardo, SEC NEWS DIGEST, Sept. 1, 1995; District Court Grants
Emergency Motion for Supplemental Provisional Relief against Life Partners
and Brian Pardo, SEC NEWS DIGEST, Mar. 21, 1996, all available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, SEC NEWS DIGEST File.
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and arranging for the resale of the investor's interest in the
life insurance upon request.0 6
In August 1995, the SEC sought to enjoin LPI from mar-
keting its viatical settlements without first complying with
securities regulations. 27 The SEC maintained that the man-
ner in which LPI promoted its viatical settlements consti-
tuted the sale of "securities" within the purview of the federal
securities acts.0 8 Specifically, the SEC asserted that LPI
violated the registration requirements of the 1933 Act,"' aswell as antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act.210
2. Judicial History at the District Court Level
Between August 1995 and March 1996, the district court
issued three injunctions against LPI.211 In August 1995, the
court held that LPI violated various sections of the federal
securities acts and ordered LPI to bring its operations into
compliance with the Securities Acts "forthwith."212  In re-
sponse to this order, LPI modified its viatical settlement pro-
gram by minimizing the number of post-purchase functions it
performed, while continuing the same pre-purchase func-
113tions.
In January 1996, the district court held that LPI had not
adequately complied with the August 1995 directive.214 Thus,
the district court enjoined LPI from offering or selling un-
registered fractional interests in viatical settlements.21 In
206. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540.
207. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17.
208. The SEC did not contend that all viatical settlements are securities, but
limited its focus to LPI's offerings to individual investors, as opposed to the vi-
atical settlements sold through participation in Individual Retirement Ac-
counts. Id. at 18.
209. Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c) (1994);
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538.
210. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538.
211. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995); SEC v.
Life Partners, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1996); SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., No.
94-1861, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3451 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 1996).
212. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 24.
213. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540. In Version I, either the company presi-
dent or LPI appeared as the legal owner of the insurance policies. Id. at 539.
In Version II, the investors were at all times the owners of record. Id. at 540.
In Version III, the investor remained the legal owner and LPI declared that it
would no longer provide any post-purchase services to purchasers either di-
rectly or indirectly. Id. at 539-40.
214. Life Partners, 912 F. Supp. at 5-6.
215. Id. at 12.
292 [Vol. 38
HOWEY'S FOURTH PRONG
its January 1996 opinion, the district court stated that "pre-
purchase activities cannot alone" subject LPI to the federal
securities acts, even though such efforts were "undeniably
essential to the overall success of the investment."21 LPI in-
terpreted this statement to mean that so long as the com-
pany discontinued its post-purchase services, the company
could resume its sales of viatical settlements. 2" LPI decided
to resume marketing its viatical settlements by its own ini-
tiative,218 whereby once an investor committed his or her
funds, LPI would cease all but the most clerical post-
purchase services.219
In response to these actions, the district court prelimi-
narily enjoined LPI from selling fractional interests in viati-
cal settlements "by any... means whatsoever" in March
1996.22' The district court held that LPI's "technical changes
had done little to alter the substance of the services provided
to the investors." '' Thereafter, LPI appealed the orders is-
sued by the district court.2 2 One of the main issues on ap-
peal was whether the fractional interests in viatical settle-
ments sold by LPI amounted to "securities" within the
meaning of the federal securities acts.223
3. The Life Partners Decision on Appeal
a. The Majority Ruling
In July 1996, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded that LPI's contracts were not
"securities" under the Howey test; thus, the allegations of se-
curities laws violations were dismissed.224 The issue turned
on whether fractional interests in viatical settlements, as
marketed by LPI, met the fourth prong of the Howey test.2'
216. Id. at 9, 9 n.7.
217. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 540.




223. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540. Although beyond the scope of this com-
ment, the first issue was whether viatical settlements were exempt from secu-
rities laws on the grounds they were insurance contracts. See id. at 541-42.
224. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538.
225. Id. at 545-48.
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However, the crux of the analysis was whether the fourth
element of the Howey test can be met, based primarily upon
the promoter's pre-purchase entrepreneurial efforts. 26 Ac-
cording to the majority, the profits from the viatical settle-
ments, realized upon the death of the insured, did not derive
predominantly from the pre-purchase or post-purchase ef-
forts of LPI."27 Instead, the court found that it was "the
length of the insured's life that [was] of overwhelming impor-
tance to the value of the viatical settlements marketed by
LPI."228 Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the district court with an order to vacate the injunctions. 9
The majority relied on Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases to
support its opinion that pre-purchase entrepreneurial func-
tions by a promoter were "irrelevant" to the expectation of
profits if not coupled with meaningful post-purchase ef-
forts. ° The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Noa
v. Key Futures, Inc."' involved investments in silver bars
where the promoter made pre-purchase efforts to identify the
investment and to locate prospective investors.' In Noa, the
court held that "[olnce the purchase ... was made, the profits
to the investor depended upon the fluctuations of the silver
market, not the managerial efforts of the promoter."233
The majority also relied on the decision of the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in McCown v. Heidler."4 In McCown,
the court addressed whether investments in undeveloped
land were securities."' The pre-purchase marketing tech-
niques of the defendants involved the promise to make future
improvements to the lots. 36 However, only the defendants'
subsequent improvements to the lots actually spurred profits
for the investors. 37
In both of these cases, the courts regarded the promoter's
pre-purchase efforts as insignificant in determining whether
226. See id. at 548.
227. Id. at 545-48.
228. Id. at 548.
229. Id. at 549.
230. Life Partners, 87 F.3d. at 546-47.
231. 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
232. Id.
233. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546 (citing Noa, 638 F.2d at 79-80).
234. 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975). See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546-47.
235. 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
236. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546-47.
237. Id. at 547 (quoting McCown, 527 F.2d at 211).
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the investments were securities.238 The Life Partners court
found that, in each of these cases, the promoter's commit-
ment to perform meaningful post-purchase functions led to
the determination of whether the Howey test was satisfied.239
Apart from its reliance on the Noa and McCown cases,
the Life Partners majority also found the administrative fee
charged by LPI to be significant.24 ° To the majority, the pro-
moter's fees represented the value of the pre-purchase efforts
to the investor.24 ' The majority surmised:
[Ihf the value of the promoter's efforts has already been
impounded into the promoter's fees or into the purchase
price of the investment, and if neither the promoter nor
anyone else is expected to make further efforts that will
affect the outcome of the investment, then the need for
federal securities regulation is greatly diminished.242
Furthermore, the Life Partners court used language from the
January 1996 district court opinion which stated that LPI's
pre-closing activities alone were not sufficient to sustain a
finding that investors' profits derive from the activities of
LPI.243 The majority found that the SEC "identified no post-
purchase service provided by LPI... that could fairly be
characterized as entrepreneurial and combined with LPI's
pre-purchase services to affect the outcome of the Howey
test." 2 44 For these reasons, the majority maintained that the
time of sale is a "legal construct but a significant one. 245
The majority agreed with the district court's finding that
LPI's pre-purchase efforts were "undeniably essential to the
overall success of the investment."246  "The investors rely





242. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
243. See id. at 547-48. The district court went further to state that it based
its decision in reliance on the "pre-closing in addition to the post-closing activi-
ties that LPI continue[d] to perform." Life Partners, 912 F. Supp. at 9 n.7.
However, after this 1996 District Court decision, LPI ceased all post-closing ac-
tivities. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540 ("LPI declared that it would no longer
provide any post-purchase services to purchasers either directly or indi-
rectly... ").
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evaluate them and their policies." 47 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority did not deem LPI's pre-purchase activities sufficient to
meet the fourth prong of the Howey test.248 Rather, the ma-
jority declared that the expectations of profits by the inves-
tors depended upon one independent variable: the time of
the insured's death.249 Thus, the majority asserted that LPI's
pre-purchase managerial efforts were irrelevant to meeting
the fourth prong of the Howey test, and "doubt[ed] that pre-
purchase services should ever count for much....""o
On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the
SEC's petition for rehearing.25' Judge Ginsburg clarified por-
tions of the July 1996 opinion and denied establishing a
"bright line rule" with respect to the fourth element of
Howey.5  In addition, she stated that "[n]othing in our appli-
cation of the Howey test can be reasonably construed to sug-
gest that pre-purchase efforts are 'irrelevant.' 25 ' The court,
however, reemphasized that pre-purchase activities alone
could not meet the fourth prong of the Howey.254
b. The Dissent
Judge Wald, in her dissent to the July 1996 opinion, ar-
gued that the fractional interests in viatical settlements
promulgated by LPI satisfied the fourth requirement of the
Howey test.25 Before developing her theory, Judge Wald first
set out three basic principles to guide her analysis."6 First,
she underscored the idea that the securities laws are to be
flexible enough to encompass a wide range of investment
products.257 Second, Judge Wald stated that "the securities
laws do not grant federal protection to all investments, but
only to that subcategory of investments that are securities."58




250. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548.
251. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
252. Id. at 588.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549-57 (Wald, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 549-50.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 550.
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form of investor protection."' With this backdrop, Judge
Wald proceeded to examine why pre-purchase managerial ac-
tivities should satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test.6 '
Judge Wald's answer to this question stressed the "kind
and degree of dependence between the investors profits and
the promoters' activities."26' In order to be deemed entrepre-
neurial efforts, "[t]hese pre-purchase activities must be di-
rected at the sale of the investment opportunity."262 If the
success of such pre-purchase activities, either entirely or
predominantly, determines whether profits are eventually
realized, then such efforts by a promoter should meet the
fourth element of the Howey test. '63 She supported her asser-
tion with the Supreme Court's application of the Howey test,
and its concern that securities are determined by their un-
derlying economic reality instead of their form.264 Judge
Wald used several federal cases to illustrate that courts fre-
quently stress pre-purchase as well as post-purchase activi-
ties of the promoter to satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey
test.65
Under Judge Wald's analysis, an investor in LPI's viati-
cal settlements relied almost entirely upon LPI's pre-
purchase managerial activities in calculating the life expec-
tancy of the insured.266 Therefore, the judge argued that
these efforts should satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey
test.267 She asserted that, in the case of LPI, the realization
of the investor's profits depended "not on the timing of the
insured's death per se [as declared by the majority] but
rather on whether the death occurs within the period esti-
mated by LPI.",68 As a final point, the dissenting opinion of-
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 551
263. Id. at 551
264. Id. at 550 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
265. Id. at 553 (citing Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918 (4th
Cir. 1990); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 240-41 (2d Cir. 1985) (stressing Merrill Lynch's
promise to maintain a secondary market for resale of certificates of deposit in
finding Howey satisfied); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d
1027 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that investors' profits depended on the promoter's
expertise in selecting whiskey)).
266. Life Partners, 87 F.3d. at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 556.
268. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
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fered other investment contexts whereby an investor relies
heavily on the promoter's pre-purchase efforts.269 For these
reasons, Judge Wald would have concluded that LPI's viati-
cal settlement program represented an "investment con-
tract," thus a "security," under the federal securities acts.27°
Judge Wald also dissented in the denial of rehearing by
the Court of Appeals in December 1996.271 In response to the
majority's statement that it did not draw a "bright line rule,"
Judge Wald stated:
72
The majority's original opinion, with its comment that "we
doubt that pre-purchase activities should ever count for
much". .. and its conclusion that the "undeniably essen-
tial" activities performed by LPI do not create a security
because they occur prior to purchase ... leaves the dis-
tinct impression that pre-purchase activities are largely
irrelevant and never, by themselves, sufficient to support
213finding that a security exists.
To conclude, Judge Wald underscored the problems that
applying the majority's "bright line rule" would have with re-
spect to asset-backed investments, as she had done in her
July 1996 opinion.2 74 Furthermore, she discussed the rapid
growth in the viatical settlement industry and warned that
the majority's ruling precludes investors from the unscrupu-
lous practices by promoters of these settlements.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The fourth prong of the Howey test mandates that the
investor's expectation of profits derive predominately from
the entrepreneurial efforts of others.276 Yet, there is no
precedent declaring that such efforts must occur after the
purchase of the investment. Despite Judge Ginsburg's re-
marks to the contrary in the December 1996 denial of re-
hearing, the Life Partners decision in July 1996277 imposes an
269. Id. at 556-57 (discussing the application of the majority's "bright line
rule" to derivatives).
270. Id. at 556.
271. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 589-90 (Wald, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 589.
273. Life Partners, 102 F.3d at 590 (Wald, J., dissenting).
274. Id.; see also supra note 269.
275. Life Partners, 102 F.3d at 590 (Wald, J., dissenting).
276. See supra Part II.E.
277. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 536.
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arbitrary time-line (the "time-line test"78) upon the fourth
prong of the Howey test. By the logic of the Life Partners
court, if the promoter of an investment contract makes pre-
purchase efforts that influence profitability, such efforts, in
the absence of substantial post-purchase efforts, could not
satisfy the Howey test's fourth prong. 79  Thus, investment
promoters that make substantial pre-purchase managerial
efforts could simply eliminate any major post-purchase ef-
forts in order to skirt the mandates of federal securities
regulation.28 ° In effect, the Life Partners court's strict de-
lineation between pre- and post-entrepreneurial efforts un-
dermines the flexible approach reflected in the Howey test.2"'
Viatical settlements, as discussed in the Life Partners
case, are among the few types of investment products where
pre-purchase activities can have a strong corollary to the in-
vestor's profits.282 In Life Partners, the promoters relied on
highly specialized information before deciding to purchase a
patient's insurance policy for the viatical settlement transac-
tion.283 This data is precisely the type of information that
would be included in a publicly available prospectus and in a
registration statement on file with the SEC. If LPI had been
forced to comply with the statutory prospectus requirements
of the 1933 Act, then the investors would have been more
adequately informed in order to assess whether or not to in-
vest. Thus, the Life Partners ruling also minimizes the
SEC's goal of ensuring investors are given adequate disclo-
sure about highly specialized investments prior to pur-
chase.28 4
Apart from viatical settlements, other investments con-
texts exist or may develop where the investor's profits are
linked to the pre-purchase efforts of the promoter285 which
depend upon the utilization of highly specialized information
278. Although Judge Ginsburg, in the December 1996 statement, called this
a "bright line rule," Life Partners, 102 F.3d at 589, the phrase "time-line test"
shall be used in this comment as a more descriptive term.
279. See supra Part II.F.3.a.
280. See infra Part V.
281. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. See id. at 555.
284. See supra Part II.B.
285. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 556-57 (Wald, J., dissenting) (applying the
majority's test to derivatives); see also Life Partners, 102 F.3d 590 (applying the
majority's test to risky asset backed investments).
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or skill.286 Thus, the "time-line rule" set forth in Life Part-
ners, if followed in other jurisdictions, threatens to immunize
other novel types of investment schemes from the purview of
the securities acts when the substance of the transaction may
mandate protection.
The following section critiques the Life Partners decision
in order to propose a more appropriate way to analyze
Howey's fourth prong that stays faithful to the underlying
"spirit"87 of the federal securities acts.
IV. ANALYSIS
This comment proposes that pre-purchase entrepreneu-
rial efforts by a promoter should be able to satisfy the fourth
element of Howey under particular circumstances."8 In order
to reach the proposed solution, this section first briefly cri-
tiques the weaknesses of the majority's decision in Life Part-
ners to suggest that its "time-line rule" should not be followed
in future cases analyzing the fourth prong of the Howey
test.8 Second, this analysis illustrates that the flexible ap-
proach underlying the Howey test, and the liberal construc-
tion given to the securities acts, render the majority's deci-
sion in Life Partners unwarranted.2 ° The third section
underscores the informational disadvantage posed to inves-
tors if the "time-line test" espoused by the majority were ap-
plied to other types of investments in the future.29' The
fourth section highlights the economic realities underlying
LPI's viatical settlements in order to show why a promoter's
pre-purchase efforts can satisfy Howey's fourth prong.292
A. Critique of the Majority Opinion in Life Partners
The Life Partners court concluded that LPI's viatical set-
tlements were not securities, primarily because the transac-
286. See, e.g., Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 557 (Wald, J., dissenting) (using the
example of a derivative arrangement, where profits depend on dealer's exper-
tise in balancing positions in different markets, rather than what happens in
the market).
287. See discussion supra Part II.B.
288. See infra Part V for further development of the proposed solution.
289. See infra Part IV.A.
290. See infra Part IV.B.
291. See infra Part IV.C.
292. See infra Part IV.D.
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tions did not meet the fourth prong of the Howey test.293 "The
combination of LPI's pre-purchase services as a finder-
promoter and its largely ministerial post-purchase services"
was not enough to establish "that the investors' profits
[flowed] predominantly from the efforts of others."294 The
opinion states that pre-purchase entrepreneurial efforts by
LPI were significant to the "overall success of the invest-
ment," but could not, by themselves, fulfill the fourth ele-
ment of the Howey test.95 These seemingly contradictory
statements were overcome by the majority's determination
that the profitability of the viatical settlements
"overwhelmingly" depended upon the death of the insured.29
Although the SEC advocated the position that pre-purchase
managerial efforts alone should satisfy this fourth element,"9
the majority rejected this position because the SEC "offer[edl
no [legal] support at all" for its assertion. 99 However, this
analysis shall reveal that there is legal support for the view
that pre-purchase efforts can satisfy the Howey test.
The majority relied upon two federal cases to bolster the
assertion that pre-purchase efforts cannot fulfill the fourth
element of the Howey test.299 Yet, the decision by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Noa v. Key Futures, Inc.3"' did not
state that pre-purchase efforts cannot fulfill the Howey
test.3"' As the district court pointed out in its January 1996
decision, the key distinction between Noa and Life Partners
was that the defendant in Life Partners performed pre-
investment work that was "undeniably essential to the over-
293. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As a mi-
nor point, the court also found that there was "no 'venture' associated with the
ownership of an insurance contract from which one's profit depends entirely
upon the mortality of the insured. . . ." Id. at 548. However, the crux of the
court's Life Partners decision was its focus upon the "efforts of others" prong of
the Howey test. Id. at 544-48.
294. Id. at 549.
295. Id. at 547.
296. Id. at 548.
297. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 546-47 (per curiam) (citing Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77
(9th Cir. 1980); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975)); see discus-
sion supra Part II.E.3.
300. 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
301. Noa, 638 F.2d at 79-80 (focusing on the post-sale fluctuations of the sil-
ver market as source of investor's profits, no discussion of pre-purchase efforts).
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all success of the investment. 3 °2 In Noa, although the pro-
moters made some pre-purchase efforts, the investor's profits
from the silver bars depended upon price fluctuations in the
silver market that were independent of the promoter's ef-
forts."3 However, in Life Partners there was no "market" to
determine an investor's profits because the viatical settle-
ments were not "liquid" assets like other types of invest-
ments such as stocks or bonds.0 4 Instead, the profits realized
to the investor were determined by whether the deaths oc-
curred within the time-frame predicted by the LPI physi-
cian.05
In McCown v. Heidler,°' the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals never addressed whether pre-purchase efforts could
satisfy the fourth element of Howey because the defendants
performed significant post-purchase functions as well.0 7
Nevertheless, the majority in Life Partners used this case to
help determine that pre-purchase functions by a promoter
are irrelevant.30 8  This determination overlooks those un-
usual, financial instruments where the pre-purchase efforts
can independently "make or break" the investment, exempli-
fied in Bailey v. J.W.K Properties, Inc.3"9 and Glen Arden
Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino.31 Thus, neither Noa nor
McCown actually espoused the view advocated by the major-
ity in Life Partners.
In addition, the majority in Life Partners considered the
administrative fee charged by LPI as significant. 31' The Life
Partners majority narrowly interpreted the meaning of the
phrase "value of the promoter's efforts" to the investor by ig-
noring the fact that promoters of securities almost always
earn a commission or charge a fee for their investment serv-
302. Life Partners, 912 F. Supp. at 9 (quoting Life Partners, 898 F. Supp at
22).
303. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546 (citing Noa, 638 F.2d at 79-80).
304. See id. at 553-55 (Wald, J., dissenting). While the majority maintained
that it was only the death of the insured that determined profit realization, this
comment accepts the view of the dissent-that it was how accurately LPI pre-
dicted the death of the insured which determined profits. Id. at 556.
305. Id. (emphasis added).
306. 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
307. Id. at 211.
308. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting).
309. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
310. 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); see supra Part II.E.4
311. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
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ices.3'2 Simply because a promoter's efforts may come before
the investment purchase should not have made the pro-
moter's fee pertinent to the Howey test analysis in the Life
Partners decision.
Finally, the majority also dismissed the value of the pre-
purchase efforts of LPI because "the length of the insured's
life" was of "overwhelming importance" to the value of the vi-
atical settlements marketed by LPI.313 However, this conclu-
sion ignores an important facet of the economic reality un-
derlying viatical settlement transactions." 4 As the dissent
noted, the expectation of profits to the LPI investor did not
depend on the death of the viator."5 Rather, the return to the
investor depended upon how accurately LPI predicted the
time of death of the viator."' As this analysis will later re-
veal, the majority's view on this point was myopic.
B. The Flexible Approach and Liberal Construction Applied
to the Interpretation of the Securities Laws
The majority in Life Partners incorporated a "time-line
rule" into Howey's fourth prong, even though courts have
never suggested that such an artificial line be drawn." ' The
majority's "time-line rule" appears to contradict the under-
lying purposes of the securities laws. The Howey test was
meant to embody "a flexible ... principle,.., capable of ad-
aptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits.""3 8
The SEC argued that drawing a bright line with respect
to the timing of entrepreneurial efforts would be
"hypertechnical."319  This "hypertechnicality" is contrary to
the liberal construction courts have traditionally applied to
the federal securities acts.2 ° As the SEC urged in Life Part-
312. See generally JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 3, at 545 (providing informa-
tion on commissions charged by dealers of securities).
313. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548 (Wald, J., dissenting).
314. See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining the emphasis courts have placed on
economic reality in determining whether a financial instrument is a security).
315. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 551.
318. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
319. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
320. See supra Part II.B.2.
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ners, the Howey case (or any Supreme Court definition case
since) did not draw a bright line distinction between pre- and
post-purchase efforts by a promoter. 3 ' Viatical settlements
are one, albeit rare, example where a promoter's managerial
efforts before the sale can determine whether the investor re-
alizes any profit.2 Therefore, such investments should not
be arbitrarily excluded from the purview of the federal secu-
rities acts. Since there is no clear precedent on this matter
and because we are in an age of rapidly developing financial
investment structures,3 3 it seems contrary to the underlying
policies of the securities laws to incorporate a rigid "time-line
rule" into the fourth element of the Howey test. The absence
of precedent on such a bright line distinction should serve as
a clear sign that the Life Partners majority lacked support for
its "time-line rule."
Many federal cases have placed great emphasis upon a
promoter's pre-purchase expertise when analyzing the fourth
prong of the Howey test. This comment proffers an extension
of such cases, and urges that federal courts consider pre-
purchase efforts in investment contract analysis if merited.
In SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc.,324 the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court emphasized the defendant's promotional efforts in
luring new recruits into a pyramid scheme as having a finan-
cial impact upon investors.32 Furthermore, in Bailey v.
J.W.K Properties, Inc.,326 investors in a cattle breeding pro-
gram depended upon the special expertise of the promoter in
the selection of cow embryos.2 7 The Bailey court found that
321. Life Partners, 87 F.3d. at 547.
322. See id. at 553 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald also examines certain
forms of "derivatives" and whether it is conceivable that the promoter's pre-
purchase efforts determine the success of the investment. See id. at 556-57. In
her dissent of the December 1996 rehearing denial, Judge Wald also postulated
that certain forms of risky "asset backed interests" would be exempt from the
securities acts under the majority's analysis. See Life Partners, 102 F.3d at 590
(Wald, J. dissenting). With certain types of long term bond packages, "the re-
alization of profits turns on the promoter's skills in selecting what bonds to
purchase." Id. (Wald, J. dissenting).
323. For instance, much has been written in regard to limited liability com-
panies. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 1596; see also Park McGinty, Limited Li-
ability Companies: Opportunity for Selective Securities Law Deregulation, 64
U. CIN. L. REV. 369 (1996).
324. 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
325. Id. at 1308; see discussion supra Part II.E.4.a.
326. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
327. Id. at 923; see discussion supra Part II.E.4.a.
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such pre-purchase expertise in selecting embryos was the
linchpin to the success of the investment.328 In Glen-Arden
Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino,"9 the court found the Howey
test satisfied based upon the defendant's "expertise in se-
lecting the type and quality of Scotch whiskey and casks to
be purchased" and that "the very investment made was in
goods specifically selected by the appellants."33 The Glen-
Arden court found that the Scotch whisky investment scheme
was one where "what was being sold was an investment en-
trusting the promoters with both the work and the expertise
to make the tangible investment pay off."33' Each of these
cases suggest that courts have placed importance upon the
pre-purchase efforts of the promoter. By placing emphasis on
the pre-purchase managerial functions of investment pro-
moters, these decisions adhere to the flexible principles that
underlies the Howey test.
The majority ruling in Life Partners imposes unneces-
sarily formal restrictions in determining that pre-purchase
efforts by a promoter cannot meet the final prong of the
Howey test. However, courts should apply the securities acts
flexibly in order to achieve their broad remedial purpose.33 '
Specifically, the interests of the investing public should be
the driving force behind the judicial determination of
whether investors need the protection of the securities acts.
The Life Partners holding that pre-purchase managerial
efforts cannot satisfy Howey's fourth prong, could offer a
"blueprint for fraud" to the investing public."33 Similarly, in
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,334 the court recog-
nized that the term "sole reliance" in the Howey test should
not be construed literally because such a construction would
328. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 924.
329. 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1992).
330. Id. at 1035; see discussion supra Part II.E.4. Furthermore,
"[alppellants also represented that they would handle all the necessary ar-
rangements for warehousing the Scotch and insuring it." Glen-Arden Com-
modities, 493 F.2d at 1035. "Finally, and probably most important to the cus-
tomers, appellants represented that they would find buyers for the Scotch or
buy it back themselves." Id.
331. Glen-Arden Commodities, 493 F.2d. at 1035.
332. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (stating that the test for an investment con-
tract embodies a "flexible ... principle"); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 126 (1953) (referring to broad remedial purposes in reaching its holding).
333. See McGinty, supra note 15, at 1051 (discussing the SEC's concerns, of
applying a too literal construction of the word "solely" in Howey test).
334. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
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"lead to unrealistic results if applied dogmatically."33
The Life Partners ruling could influence how promoters
of other investments structure their arrangements.33 Pro-
moters of investment schemes who perform significant pre-
and post-purchase efforts could eliminate their post-purchase
efforts to avoid coverage by securities acts. This is precisely
what LPI did after the January 1996 directive by the district
court.3 Thus, by setting a formal time-line regarding when
the entrepreneurial efforts must take place, the court is en-
couraging other companies to follow LPI's lead on how to
avoid the grasp of the federal securities acts. Therefore,
adopting the Life Partners view could undercut Howey's
flexible principle of adapting to the "countless and variable
schemes" that are possible in the investment world."8
The following hypothetical illustrates why a liberal view
should be applied with respect to the fourth element of the
Howey test. The purpose of this hypothetical is to show that
the rigidity of the majority's opinion could lead to an illogical
conclusion.
Suppose that an investment promoter, on the verge of
forming a competing viatical settlement program with LPI,
convince a group of people, Group A, to invest their money in
the promoter's proposed enterprise. Through a written con-
tract, the parties would agree that the promoter would use
the investor's money to locate insured, terminally ill patients
who would participate in viatical settlement transactions.
The promoter would research use Group A's funds to the life
expectancy of the patients who agree to participate. Those
viators calculated by the promoter (or its employed physi-
cian) to have life expectancies of two years or less would be
the only ones selected to participate in the viatical settlement
transactions. Once these viators agreed to sell interests in
their life insurance policies, the original investors, Group A,
would be given interests in these policies. Under these facts,
clearly a court would hold that the transaction between the
promoter and Group A constitutes an "investment contract"
under section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, because all of the entre-
preneurial efforts took place after Group A's commitment of
335. Id at 483.
336. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 538.




After this initial round of investments, suppose that the
promoter conducts additional research, using the funds
vested by Group A, and locates more patients that are also
calculated to have a life expectancy of two years or less and
who want to participate in a viatical settlement transaction.
At this point, the promoter finds a second group of investors,
Group B, to participate in the viatical settlement transaction.
Prior to Group B's financial commitment, most of the pro-
moters' entrepreneurial efforts have taken place, for all via-
tors have been located. Yet, under the rubric put forth in the
Life Partners decision, the investments made by Group B
would not constitute "securities" simply because the efforts of
the promoter took place prior to the sale of the investment.
For Group A, the viatical settlements would be deemed
"securities;" however, for Group B, they would not.
This hypothetical illustrates the contradictory results
that could take place under the Life Partners ruling. It also
bolsters the assertion that the fourth prong of the Howey test
also should be liberally interpreted to include pre-purchase
efforts, in order to encompass unusual investments.
C. The Investor's Need for Information
The Howey decision underscored the importance of dis-
closing key information to investors prior to their commit-
ment of funds.339 The federal securities acts reflect the belief
that information is the most important form of investor pro-
tection.34 ° In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,41 the Supreme
Court remarked that "the design of these statutes is to pro-
tect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed decisions.'42 As Judge Wald
remarked in her dissent:
[W]hat the investor needs to know is... what the specific
risk factors attached to the investment are and whether
there is any reason why the investor should be leery of the
promoter's promises. This need for information holds true
in regard to investors prior to purchase as much as to in-
vestors who have committed their funds-indeed, more so,
339. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
340. See supra Part II.B.
341. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
342. Id. at 119; see supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
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if they are to avoid over-risky investments.34
The Life Partners majority conceded that coverage of the
LPI viatical settlements by the federal securities acts "might
increase the quantity (and perhaps the quality) of informa-
tion available to the investor prior to the closing." " How-
ever, the court did not find this a sufficiently persuasive jus-
tification to compel LPI's compliance with the federal
securities acts.346
When applying the Howey test, courts have expressed an
interest in protecting passive investors who are at an infor-
mational disadvantage "or who must rely on a promoter for
some unique expertise."3" In the case of the viatical settle-
ments marketed by LPI, investors were at a distinct
"informational disadvantage." The information pertinent to
the profitability of LPI's viatical settlements was based upon
knowledge and data that the average, or even sophisticated,
investor would have had great difficulty in accessing or dis-
covering through independent means. 47
For example, LPI's investors relied on the expertise of
the company's reviewing physician in deciding whether to
participate in the viatical settlement transaction. 8 This
physician based the crucial life expectancy estimates on fac-
tors including: T-cell count, incidence of opportunistic infec-
tion, platelet count, pulmonary studies, and advances in the
treatment of AIDS. 49 Besides this scientific information, an
investor had to rely upon LPI's pre-purchase investigations
for price valuations of insurance policies and LPI's knowledge
of insurance laws and laws affecting viatical settlements.35 °
Clearly, the utilization of such information requires a level of
education and training that most investors would not pos-
sess. Furthermore, in order for LPI's potential investors to
learn of its pre-purchase research concerning its viatical set-
343. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 552 (Wald, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 547.
345. Id. at 549.
346. Id. at 554 (Wald, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See supra notes 324-
31 and accompanying text for other cases where courts emphasized a pro-
moter's pre-purchase entrepreneurial efforts.
347. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 555-56 (Wald, J., dissenting).
348. See id. for a more detailed explanation of the pre-purchase investiga-
tions LPI performed.
349. Id. at 555.
350. Id. at 555-56 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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tlements, they had to go to LPI's office.35' By contrast, under
federal securities regulations, LPI would have had to disclose
to the SEC detailed information about its pre-purchase in-
vestigations through a registration statement and prospec-
tus.35 ' This information would become public information
and would enable investors to form an independent educated
opinion about whether to invest in an LPI viatical settle-
ment.353 In addition, such disclosure to the SEC would reduce
the likelihood that promoters of viatical settlements could
deceptively portray their assessments to the public.5
D. Economic Realities Underlying LPI's Pre-Purchase
Entrepreneurial Efforts
The definition cases that followed Howey have under-
scored the idea that the "form [of an investment] should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality."355 The majority in Life Partners made
"economic" observations as to why the viatical settlements at
issue were not "securities." As highlighted above, two eco-
nomic reasons the majority used to reach its conclusion were:
(1) the promoter's fee represented the full extent of the value
of the pre-purchase efforts; and (2) the profit realization by
the investor depended entirely upon the death of the in-
sured.356 However, these findings by the Life Partners ma-
jority did not acknowledge the nexus between the pre-
purchase efforts by the promoter and the ultimate profit re-
alization by the investor.3 7 The dissent's better-reasoned in-
terpretation of the economic realities underlying LPI's viati-
cal settlements suggests how LPI's pre-purchase managerial
efforts substantially affected the investor's profit realization
and should, therefore, have come within the purview of the
securities laws.3 58
The dissent carefully scrutinized the nexus between in-
351. Id. at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting).
352. See supra Part II.A.
353. See supra Part II.A.
354. It should be noted that no purchasers of LPI's viatical settlements had
filed complaints against the company. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539.
355. United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975) (quoting
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
356. See supra Part IV.A.
357. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 554-55 (Wald, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 554-56.
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vestment and profit realization in determining whether LPI's
pre-purchase managerial efforts satisfied Howey's fourth
prong.359 The majority stressed that it was the time of death
of the patient that determined the level of investor profit.6 °
However, under Judge Wald's analysis, the true indicator of
the profits realized by an investor stemmed from the dili-
gence and accuracy of LPI in determining the life expectan-
cies of the viators3 6'
In its promotional materials, LPI highlighted its per-
formance of a detailed assessment of the viator's medical
condition."' If the LPI examining physician grossly underes-
timated the viator's life span, the profit realization would be
greatly diminished.363 For example, if the physician did not
look at the availability of certain AIDS treatment drugs,
which could increase the average life expectancy of the via-
tors, then the investor would have to wait substantially
longer to collect on his investment, thus decreasing the rate
of return on the viatical settlement purchase. Another sce-
nario could arise in which the LPI physician misinterpreted
or intentionally misstated scientific data concerning the via-
tor's medical condition.3 64 LPI's highly skilled pre-purchase
research could have adversely affected the investors' profits.
The following hypothetical illustrates the economic con-
sequences of LPI's pre-purchase managerial efforts.
Suppose that an investor has acquired a 3% fractional
interest in the $100,000 life insurance policy of a terminally
ill person (a $3,000 face value) for just $650 (disregarding
any administrative fees). 66 This investor hopes to reap the
$3,000 payment within a time frame that lets the investor
enjoy a high yearly rate of return. As in Life Partners, sup-
359. Id. at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting); see supra note 14.
360. Id. at 548.
361. Id. at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting); Life Partners, 912 F. Supp. at 8-9
(observing that pre-investment work by LPI was undeniably essential to the
overall success of the investment).
362. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting).
363. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
364. This negligence or misstatement by LPI, if conveyed in a prospectus, as
required under section 5(a) of the 1933 Act, could become the basis for a Rule
10b-5 antifraud suit by the investors. See supra note 113; see also 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
365. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539. The fractional interest purchase option
was one of the unique options offered by LPI that distinguished it from other
dealers in viatical settlements. Id.
310 [Vol. 38
HOWEY'S FOURTH PRONG
pose the promoter selected patients whose life expectancy
was determined to be twenty-four months or less.366 If the
viators were to die within two years, as calculated by the ex-
amining physician, then the $3,000 (or $2,350 profit) would
represent a 115% yearly rate of return on the investment, an
earnings rate much higher than most aggressive stocks or
mutual funds. 67 If, through gross oversight during the pro-
moter's pre-purchase efforts, the doctor overlooked the intro-
duction of new AIDS treatment drugs in the assessment and
the insured lived ten years longer than predicted, the same
$2,350 profit twelve years from the investment would repre-
sent only a 13% yearly rate of return. 68 Because the death of
the insured is the point at which the investor receives his
earnings, the underestimation in life expectancy prediction
would lead to a significantly lower realized rate of return.
Thus, this hypothetical illustrates that the economic realities
underlying a promoter's pre-purchase efforts can support a
finding that the fourth prong of the Howey test is met.
In sum, the foregoing analysis reveals that legal and
economic support exists to bolster the idea that pre-purchase
managerial efforts should be relevant to an analysis of
whether the fourth prong of the Howey test is satisfied. As
the court in Bailey v. J.W.K Properties, Inc.36 underscored, a
"broad consideration of all the surrounding circumstances"
should be used in determining whether an investment
scheme is a "security.""37 Most importantly, the flexible ap-
proach advocated in Howey should be controlling in any in-
vestment contract analysis.37 ' The "time-line rule" estab-
lished by the D.C. Circuit 7 12 counters this notion of flexibility.
This comment does not suggest that any kind of pre-purchase
efforts would meet the fourth prong of Howey, just those ef-
forts that satisfy the criteria proposed in the following sec-
tion.
366. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17.
367. The yearly rate of return, r, can be calculated by solving 650(1 + r)'=
3000 (setting t equal to the number of years until the $3000 is paid).
368. See supra note 367.
369. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
370. Id. at 922.
371. See supra Part II.D.
372. See supra Part III.
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V. PROPOSAL
Prior to Life Partners, no case explicitly held that pre-
373purchase activities could not satisfy Howey's fourth prong.
Future courts should not embrace the "time-line rule" advo-
cated by the Life Partners majority. This comment proposes
a test that embraces the views of the SEC and of the dissent
as expressed in Life Partners. According to the approach ad-
vocated by Judge Wald, pre-purchase managerial efforts can
satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test."4 Judge Wald
proffered a test that would focus on the "kind and degree of
dependence between the investors' profits and the promoter's
activities."3"' Using this as a basis, this comment proposes
the following approach to addressing the legal uncertainty
surrounding the Howey test's fourth prong. This liberal ap-
proach considers a variety of factors.
In order to trigger the application of this approach, two
threshold matters must be ascertained with respect to the
investment. First, as it is uncommon for a promoter's efforts
to come almost exclusively before the sale of the invest-
ment,376 this approach would apply only if the promoter's en-
trepreneurial efforts take place primarily before the sale of
the investment. Second, the investment must meet the first
three elements of the Howey test: (1) a transaction or con-
tract, (2) concerning the investment of money, (3) in a com-
mon enterprise.377
Once these criteria are established, the third part of this
approach emphasizes the quality and quantity of information
that a promoter relies upon in trying to establish and market
the investment opportunity. If the information is particu-
larly specialized-that which even a sophisticated investor
could not easily ascertain through diligent research-then it
suggests a finding that the "pre-purchase efforts" should
373. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 553 (Wald, J., dissenting); see also supra note
13.
374. Id. at 554-57.
375. Id. at 551.
376. Id. at 553.
377. This approach would only apply to those novel investments that fall into
the "investment contract" category. As noted by the Supreme Court in
Landreth, the application of the Howey test to traditional stocks and all other
types of instruments would make the enumerated categories of section 2(1) of




satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test. This considera-
tion stems from the concept, well established in securities
law, that information is the best form of investor protec-
tion. 78 Such specialized information would, therefore, be
publicly disclosed by the promoters in accordance with the
requirements of the 1933 Act.
379
The fourth part of this approach addresses the economic
realities underlying the transaction at issue. The pre-
purchase efforts must be significant and inextricably linked
to the profit realization,8 ° incorporating the approach advo-
cated by Judge Wald's dissent. 31 The courts should examine
the link between the investor's profits and the efforts by the
promoter. The courts could consider whether there is a di-
rect correlation between the pre-purchase efforts and profits
or whether the profits stem from an independent variable-
such as the price fluctuations in an independent commodities
market." 2
As a final consideration, the courts must isolate the pre-
purchase entrepreneurial efforts and ascertain whether these
efforts, if taken after the investor committed his funds, would
satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test. An affirmative
answer to this inquiry suggests a finding that the investment
is a security. The hypothetical utilized in the previous sec-
tion3 3 illustrated the inconsistent results that could ensue if
the "time-line test" advocated by the Life Partners majority
were adopted by other courts. Should a promoter's efforts
satisfy the "efforts of others prong" were they to come after
the purchase, then the same pre-sale efforts must meet the
fourth prong of the Howey test.
This five part approach embraces the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" that courts may examine in determining
whether certain unusual types of investments satisfy the
fourth element of the Howey test. Of the five parts of the ap-
proach, courts should stress the type of information relied
upon by the promoter because it can help determine whether
378. See discussion supra Parts IIB, IV.C.
379. See discussion supra Part II.A.
380. See discussion supra Part IV.D. This element of my proposed test con-
siders the economic reality underlying the transaction.
381. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 550-55 (Wald, J., dissenting).
382. See, e.g., Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980) (per cu-
riam).
383. See supra Part IV.B.
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the disclosure requirements compelled by the 1933 Act would
favor the investor. The more specialized the information, the
more an investor is at an "informational disadvantage."384
The greater the disadvantage, the more appropriate it would
be to compel the promoters to comply with the disclosure re-
quirements of the 1933 Act.385
This approach would be useful in future litigation con-
cerning investment contract analyses where there are over-
whelming pre-purchase managerial efforts exerted by the
promoter on behalf of the investment product.86 Viatical set-
tlements are one such instance. The approach advocated in
this comment is faithful to the Howey test's notion of flexi-
bility in an increasingly complex financial world. This test
could apply to other types of financial arrangements where
the efforts of the promoter take place prior to purchase.387
Unlike the majority's opinion in Life Partners, this approach
embraces the principles underlying the Howey test: flexibil-
ity, 88 emphasis on economic reality,389 and the belief that dis-
closure is the best form of investor protection.8 °
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment focused on the "definition of a security" as
it applies to investment contracts. Although the test enunci-
ated in the Howey decision remains the principal test for in-
vestment contract analysis, much uncertainty remains re-
384. See supra Part IV.C.
385. If background information surrounding the potential profitability of an
investment was based on factors that are common knowledge, or factors that
are readily discoverable through research that a reasonably educated investor
could perform, then it would be more difficult to argue that the federal securi-
ties laws apply.
386. For instance, in her dissent, Judge Wald stressed that the majority's
"bright-line rule" would apply in other investment contexts, including some
types of derivatives. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 556-57 (Wald, J. dissenting).
Judge Wald explained that in the derivative transactions, "the significant
managerial activity of the derivative dealer-the selection and structuring of
the derivative instrument and the investigation of the parties' financial
status-usually occurs before the parties enter into the transaction." Id. at 557
(emphasis added).
387. Id. at 556-57 (discussing application of majority's test to derivatives);
see also Life Partners, 102 F.3d at 590 (discussing applicability of majority's
rule to risky asset-backed securities).
388. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
389. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
390. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
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garding how to interpret its elements. As to the fourth ele-
ment, this comment has espoused the idea that pre-purchase,
entrepreneurial efforts by the promoter of an investment
scheme can satisfy this prong of the Howey test under the
prescribed approach outlined above.
This comment used the recent decision in SEC v. Life
Partners391 to analyze an unresolved issue with respect to the
fourth prong of the Howey test. While the Life Partners case
involved viatical settlements,392 the purpose of the comment
was not to argue that viatical settlements are securities per
se. Rather, this comment used the case of viatical settle-
ments to expose an existing uncertainty about the fourth
prong of the Howey test. The viatical settlements at issue in
Life Partners represent a rare type of investment where sig-
nificant efforts by the promoter take place prior to the sale.9
The Life Partners holding suggests that only the efforts of an
investment promoter which take place after the sale of an in-
vestment can be considered in meeting this element.3"4 How-
ever, such a "time-line rule" undermines the flexible ap-
proach afforded by the seminal Howey decision.
As financial markets advance, new types of investment
instruments and schemes will continue to develop. The
profitability of some of these investments, like viatical set-
tlements, may stem from a promoter's pre-purchase entre-
preneurial efforts. Thus, the "time-line rule" espoused in Life
Partners would preclude such investments from coverage un-
der the federal securities acts, even though economic realities
may dictate otherwise. Similarly, such a rigid test could be
an inducement for fraud. Given the flexible approach advo-
cated in Howey and in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
future courts should analyze pre-purchase managerial efforts
using the advocated five part approach to determine if such
efforts satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test.
Stephanie Ann Miranda
391. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 555 (Wald, J. dissenting).
394. See id. at 545-49.
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